EVAWEB: a Web-based assessment system to learn X.509/PKIX-based digital signatures by González-Tablas, Ana Isabel et al.
112 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EDUCATION, VOL. 50, NO. 2, MAY 2007
EVAWEB: A Web-Based Assessment System to
Learn X.509/PKIX-Based Digital Signatures
Ana Isabel González-Tablas Ferreres, Member, IEEE, Karel Wouters, Benjamín Ramos Álvarez, and
Arturo Ribagorda Garnacho
Abstract—EVAWEB is a Web-based assessment system that has
been developed to evaluate the learning enhancement produced by
the use of X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (X.509/PKIX)-based
digital signatures in a real environment. EVAWEB allows the stu-
dents to experience main X.509/PKIX processes related to the dig-
ital signature mechanism. In this paper, EVAWEB and its assess-
ment by the students are described.
Index Terms—Digital signatures, innovation in security
teaching, Web-based assessment, X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
(X.509/PKIX).
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, digital signatures, a kind of electronic ana-logue of handwritten signatures, are one of the core tech-
nologies in the information security field. Moreover, several Eu-
ropean countries are deploying electronic identity cards, which
allow the citizen to produce qualified signatures, legally equiv-
alent to hand-written signatures [1]. Digital signatures are sup-
ported by public key certificates and Public Key Infrastructures
(PKI). A public key certificate commonly means an electronic
document that binds securely a public key with some identifi-
cation. The most common public key certificate standard is the
recommendation X.509, developed by the Telecommunication
Standardization Sector of the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU-T) [2]. A PKI provides the tools and operations
that enable practical deployment of applications using public
key certificates and, therefore, digital signatures. The Internet
X.509 Public-Key Infrastructure (PKIX) Working Group within
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is specifying a PKI
for the Internet [3] using as base the ITU-T recommendation
X.509. The whole set of PKIX documents is usually called the
X.509/PKIX framework. The understanding of X.509/PKIX-
based digital signatures and the tools which support them are
crucial for students on information technologies and, to some
extent, also for the general public.
ITIG10027—Security on Information Technologies
(ITIG10027) is a mandatory course for third-year students
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of computer science engineering at Universidad Carlos III de
Madrid in Spain. The total amount of hours assigned to the
course is 75, 45 of them devoted to theory, and 30 to laboratory
sessions.
The theory part of the course covers main aspects of security
on information systems including security mechanisms, mal-
ware (malicious software), systems and physical security, se-
curity management, and legal aspects of security. Digital signa-
tures and public key certificates are set out in the units related
to security mechanisms and legal aspects of security.
A first block of laboratory sessions is devoted to carry out
cryptography exercises including modular arithmetic, classical
cryptography, symmetric and asymmetric modern encryption
systems, hash functions, digital signature systems, and some
simple cryptanalysis methods. In a second block of laboratory
sessions, students must learn several security tools: Ethereal
for network analysis, Aide for file system integrity verification,
some simple rootkit software (a rootkit is a type of malicious
software), Iptables and Snort as examples of firewall and intru-
sion detection systems, and the OpenSSL library and the Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP) software as tools for computing hash func-
tions, performing encryption and digital signatures, and man-
aging public key certificates.
Motivation and goal—From the students’ point of view, the
curriculum content of the course ITIG10027 is huge and novel,
which hinders the students from grasping it appropriately. To
lessen students’ efforts, the assessment method chosen by the
teachers for the second block of laboratory sessions is to per-
form multiple-choice tests immediately after the sessions, so
that the amount of work students must perform outside the ses-
sions is reduced. However, this assessment approach does not
favor a long-lasting learning.
In the last years, an increasing effort for innovating the
teaching of information systems security has been noticed
[4]. One of the approaches is to make the students practice
in real or quasi-real environments, which in this case implies
security risks. Furthermore, part of the academic community
disapproves this approach because they believe that it educates
hackers instead of security defenders. Despite difficulties and
criticism, learning-by-doing in context stands as a successful
educational theory in many study areas, and it is being inte-
grated more and more in the teaching of information systems
security [5].
The goal of the work presented in this paper is to evaluate how
the use of the approach of learning-by-doing in context may en-
hance the students’ learning of the X.509/PKIX framework and
digital signatures based on it. To achieve this goal, 1) EVAWEB,
which stands for “Sistema de EVAluación vía WEB” in Spanish
0018-9359/$25.00 © 2007 IEEE
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(“Web-based assessment system” in English) that forces the stu-
dents to use X.509/PKIX-based digital signatures, has been im-
plemented; 2) EVAWEB has been evaluated by part of the stu-
dents enrolled on ITIG10027.
Organization—In Section II, related work is analyzed.
Section III describes EVAWEB and its intended use by the
students to learn X.509/PKIX-based digital signatures. Finally,
Sections IV and V present the assessment of the experience and
the conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
Despite the risks involved in using X.509/PKIX-based digital
signatures [6], they are being used in several electronic applica-
tions such as e-government, e-commerce, or e-Health [7]–[9].
Several researchers propose the use of PKI to solve most of
the security problems in Higher Education [10]–[12]; some of
them point out explicitly the use of this technology for pro-
viding nonrepudiation in electronic assessments [10]. However,
despite PKI’s advantages, deploying and maintaining such an
infrastructure is a complex task, possibly being one reason that
discourages the integration of digital signatures in e-learning en-
vironments or, at least, in e-learning tools. The authors are not
aware of any e-learning tool that integrates X.509/PKIX-based
digital signatures in Web-based on-line assessment.
One option to make students practice with X.509/PKIX-
based digital signatures is to give them some naïve exer-
cises, for example, using the OpenSSL tool. PGP is another
framework that provides support for digital signatures, and
it can also be used to teach digital signatures to the students
[13]. However, PGP framework is used more for informal
authentication, and it has not been widely deployed in real
applications, such as e-government and e-banking, because of
the Web-of-trust paradigm it relies on (different from the one
used in the X.509/PKIX framework). Therefore, in the long
term, learning X.509/PKIX-based digital signatures is more
advantageous for the students.
The approach taken in this work is different from the usual
approaches for teaching X.509/PKIX-based digital signatures
in the sense that EVAWEB, the implemented system, provides a
real environment that allows the students to experience most of
the main processes defined in the X.509/PKIX framework and
to use digital signatures with a real purpose and context.
III. DESCRIPTION OF EVAWEB
EVAWEB is a Web-based assessment system that allows
teachers to manage users (students and teachers), tests and
question pools, and to generate the students’ public key cer-
tificates. On the other hand, EVAWEB guides the students in
some X.509/PKIX processes (signature key pair generation
and public key certificate acquisition) and allows the students
to perform Web-based tests and consult their grades. EVAWEB
forces the students to sign the Web-based tests before submit-
ting them to the server; in turn, EVAWEB returns the students a
signed answer containing the grade. Each signed message can
be used by the receiving party as non-repudiation evidence.
EVAWEB has a three-tier architecture deployed in a Web ap-
plication server running on a servlet container (Tomcat 5) on the
server side (Fig. 1) and a Web client (MSIE, Netscape, Firefox)
Fig. 1. Architecture of EVAWEB: server side.
Fig. 2. Architecture of EVAWEB: client side.
supported by some processing capabilities on the client side
(Fig. 2). In the following, EVAWEB architecture is briefly de-
scribed; more details about the implementation can be found
in [14], [15].
On the server side three main modules can be identified
which have been implemented with three servlets: the assess-
ment servlet, the database management servlet, and the PKI
servlet. The assessment servlet is in charge of serving students’
test requests and processing the test answers. The database
management servlet is used for consulting, inserting, modifying
and deleting users, subjects, and tests in the database. The PKI
servlet is in charge of providing the basic functionality of a
PKI. On the server side also a database exists containing users
and tests information and a repository (KeyStore) containing
the server signature keys and all the certificates.
On the client side, JavaScript is used to make local form vali-
dations and to improve interactivity. The signature on the client
side is performed via a signing applet which communicates with
the user through the browser via JavaScript.
In the following, how the X.509/PKIX framework is inte-
grated in EVAWEB and the process that a student should follow
to use the system are described.
A. Introduction to X.509/PKIX Framework
In public key cryptography, each user owns a pair of mathe-
matically related keys called the public key and the private key.
Although the public key is accessible by everyone, the private
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Fig. 3. An example of an answered and signed test (only one question).
key must be kept secret and be known only by the key pair
owner. Digital signatures are generated using the private key
and are verified using the public key. Signatures produced this
way offer data origin authentication, entity authentication, and
nonrepudiation.
Digital signatures must be supported by a trust model that se-
curely binds some identification of the owner, such as an identity
or a pseudonym, to the public key. The electronic document that
ascertains the authenticity of the binding is called public key cer-
tificate. Certificates are issued by a trusted entity that is called
Certification Authority (CA) in the context of the X.509/PKIX
framework. A public key certificate comprises at least the public
key, the identification of its owner, a period of validity, and the
CA’s digital signature over the previous data. To verify a signa-
ture, the verifier will first check the signature using the public
key, then the validity status of the certificate (e.g., if it has been
revoked).
In the X.509/PKIX framework several processes are speci-
fied. The main process is the end entity certificate enrolment,
which results in the issuance of an end entity1 public key cer-
tificate by the CA, and it is comprised by three steps: registra-
tion, initialization, and certification. Other main X.509/PKIX
1In EVAWEB scenario this entity is mainly the student.
processes are the certificate revocation request and certificate
revocation list consultation, by which an end entity requests a
certificate revocation to make it invalid before its expiration date
or consults which certificates have been revoked. This work fo-
cuses on the end entity certificate enrolment; in the following
section how this process is integrated in EVAWEB is described.
B. End Entity Certificate Enrolment in EVAWEB
Registration. All students must enrol into the PKI before they
can apply any of the enabled services. In EVAWEB this step
occurs at the same time as the registration to the Web-based
assessment system. The student is issued a shared secret that
he/she must use for subsequent authentication as the enrolment
process continues. As a requirement in EVAWEB, he/she must
deliver also his/her digital photograph.
Initialization. In this step the student initializes the trust re-
lation between him/her and the CA by following EVAWEB’s
instructions. The student uses a key generation tool to generate
a key pair and the associated certificate request, which contains,
among others, the public key. EVAWEB allows the student to
submit the request to the CA and get the set of EVAWEB’s
certificates.
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Fig. 4. Receipt of submission including grade.
Certification. The student’s public key certificate is issued by
the CA (the PKI servlet) and can be downloaded by the student
from the repository.
C. Using X.509/PKIX-Based Digital Signatures in EVAWEB
After accessing the system, a student can choose to perform
one of the available tests. To submit an answered test, students
must first generate a signature on their answers and some other
data (Fig. 3).
In EVAWEB, the signature is performed outside the Web
browser by the signing applet. To generate the signature, first,
the signed applet shows the student the answered test. Then, the
student indicates where the private key is stored and types the
passwords that protect the keystore and the key. Afterwards, the
signing applet generates the signature (using the student’s pri-
vate key), appends it to the answered test, and submits all to the
server.
Once the server receives the signed test, the signature is ver-
ified. EVAWEB will not accept a submission if the signature
is incorrect. If the verification has been successful, the server
calculates the grade and returns the student a signed receipt of
his/her assessment submission, including the grade (Fig. 4). The
student can verify the server’s signature and save the receipt.
IV. EVALUATION
EVAWEB has been evaluated by an experimentation group of
28 volunteer students over the whole set of 83 students enrolled
in the subject. Only 21 of the students in the group completed
successfully the process of certification and assessment at least
one of the three times they were asked. Besides, the students
had to fill in the test on paper. At the end, the 28 students in the
experimentation group were requested to evaluate the system
by filling in an anonymous evaluation form. The most rele-
vant questions contained in the evaluation form are presented
in Table I, and statistics are presented in Table II.
Results in set (a) questions show that students evaluate Web-
based assessment positively but do not completely trust this
method using EVAWEB, because 46% of them do not agree on
performing the tests using only the prototype (question a4). Stu-
dents’ fear is probably caused by the novelty of the system or
by the preliminary state of the prototype. Results may have also
been influenced by the seven students who never completed the
tests.
Results of set (b) show that about 80% of the students agree
on integrating digital signatures to provide nonrepudiation
proofs of origin and receipt, respectively, for teachers and stu-
dents (questions b1 and b2), but a slightly smaller percentage
of about 70% (questions b3 and b4) considers that using the
prototype helped him/her to better understand digital signatures
and X.509/PKIX framework. An interpretation of the results
of set (b) is that students assess the integration quite posi-
tively, but more work needs to be done to enhance EVAWEB’s
user-friendliness and usefulness for helping students to un-
derstand target technologies. In the evaluation of students’
experience using the prototype in set (c), nearly 70% evaluate
it positively and consider repeating the experience next year
advantageous, in ITIG10027 and other subjects.
V. CONCLUSION
A main contribution of the research presented in this paper
is the innovation in the teaching of X.509/PKIX-based digital
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TABLE I
QUESTIONS IN THE EVALUATION FORM
TABLE II
RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION (PERCENTAGES ARE ROUNDED).
(T = TOTAL, Q = QUITE, P = PARTIALLY, O = OTHERS)
signatures. The goal was to enhance the students’ under-
standing and learning of X.509/PKIX-based digital signatures
by immersing them in an environment (learning-by-doing)
where the use of this kind of signature is mandatory and has a
real purpose. The chosen environment has been a Web-based
assessment system, EVAWEB, which has been implemented
to allow the evaluation of the learning-by-doing approach to
teach X.509/PKIX digital signatures. Results show that the
experience has been an above average success; some aspects
must be enhanced, mainly the trust of students on EVAWEB
and the pedagogical capabilities of the system.
In addition, the experience has led to some useful insights.
EVAWEB has an integrated PKI that has to be deployed and
maintained, not a straightforward task, requiring a great effort
from the teachers. Furthermore, users must be strictly educated
in the use of the PKI. This education should not be a problem
if the users are students with a computer science background.
However, if the use of the system is extended to other student
profiles, the system must become more user-friendly and more
effort be placed in user education. On the other hand, extending
the use of the system to all students offers them a relatively
simple environment for learning digital signatures in an easy
way and becoming e-identity educated citizens.
Some future work can be identified such as enhancing the
system’s functionalities, improving usability and security, and
increasing pedagogical capabilities. Furthermore, EVAWEB
should be made modular (to integrate it easily with other
Web-based e-learning systems) and compliant with existing
e-learning and education standards. Integrating the system with
an enhanced out-of-the box PKI with an LDAP repository
[16] would be desirable, as would implementing the signature
functionality on an electronic identity card. Experiments with
students from nontechnical faculties should also be adopted.
Finally, a proper study of the performance of EVAWEB should
be completed, although both server and client performances
have been acceptable during the evaluation (only 15 students
using it simultaneously).
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